The report says that data of acoustic sensors and tight measurements on board indicated that the envelope suffered delamination after a dive to the Titanic in 2022, causing a loud explosion. Rush reportedly rejected that noise, and the report found that no one remains at the company in 2023, which was able to adequately interpret the sensory data. The company’s director of engineering stopped two months before the implosion.
“The power was consolidated in Mr. Rush,” says Neubauer. “There was no given standard about how loud noise or how many noises will make you get it out. I think that was meant. They didn’t want to get it out of the end.”
The report contains numerous recommendations that would increase federal overview of underwaterworks operated by US companies. It would also require them to be certified with third party organizations, such as Lloyd’s Register or the US shipping office, even if they served in international waters like the Titan. This would in practice discard construction of a carbon fiber envelope, as none of these organizations have classified a ship -carbon fiber submergable so far. “It doesn’t seem to be the right material because of the way it takes cumulative damage over time,” says Neubauer.
Tony Nissen, the original director of Oceangate engineering, questions the white criticism of the carbon fiber report and its acoustic monitoring system. He notes that problems with the Titan’s first envelope were identified, in part, using the acoustic sensors, leading it to be removed and replaced. “The design was not inadequate. For anyone to say that the design was inadequate, they will have to deal with the original manufacturer’s analysis and the success of the first envelope,” he says. “The real -time monitoring worked as projected and intended, but for the second envelope they ignored it.”
“We recommend the US Coast Guard for its thorough work to confirm what industry experts have long known about the Titan Tragedy-it was preventable,” says Will Kohnen, executive director of the non-profit world underwater organization. “The challenge is now advancing, building a better national and international regulatory framework for underwater operations, so that security and responsible dominance is the standard through this unique and complex industry.”
The Coast Guard report also affects the search and rescue problems after the Titan went missing. Neubauer says that some of the organizations listed as Oceangate’s emergency contacts were unaware of the titan’s dive plans, and that the company should have a robotic remotely operated vehicle (ROV) capable of diving to the same depth as the submerged.
Although the world was in Tenterhooks during the four -day search and SAV effort for the Titan, Neubauer is skeptical that it could ever have succeeded.
“Although we eventually found the underwater in the 96 -hour window that was advertised, I don’t think we could be recovered from the under or the people if they survived and it was involved at the bottom,” he says. The ROV, who placed the waste, had only a minimum ability to move or release the titan, especially considering that there will be less than an hour of oxygen.
The report on the Coast Guard notes that if Rush survived, he may be subject to criminal processing for neglect. It does not identify anyone else as subjected to an inquiry. However, Wired reported last year that the southern district of New York was pursuing Criminal investigation in Oceangate, possibly related to its funding. The Department of Justice has not confirmed that a survey and its current state are uncertain.
Relatives of Nargeolet process over Oceangate, Rush’s farm, and others involved in the manufacture of Titan in Washington State. Survivors from Rush, Nargeolet, and the paying passengers did not respond to requests for comment.
Oceangate delivered the following statement: “We again offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who died on June 18, 2023, and to all affected by the tragedy.
